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THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
A Monthly Low Review

"Law is the perfection of human reason"
Volume I

MARCH 1926

Number 5

CURIOSITIES OF THE LAW : A CASE
IN PUNCTUATION
By

DUDLEY

G.

WOOTEN

It would be a most commendable achievement if some one
would do for the Law what Isaac Disraeli, the father of Lord
Beaconsfield, did for Literature. That scholarly English Jew
contributed a vast and valuable fund of writing to the assets
of British letters during a long life of intellectual industry, but
the most celebrated of his works was undoubtedly his "Curiosities of Literature," a series of volumes issued over a space of
forty years, and which unfortunately are little read nowadays.
They are a veritable treasure-house of interesting and instructive facts about literature and literary men, anecdotal and critical miscellanies, dealing with historical events and curious incidents in the lives and productions of the great and near-great
in the realm of learning. Although the field is equally as wide
and varied, and fully as fruitful in its attractions, no such work
has ever been accomplished for the Law and its votaries. Desultory and fugitive volumes have been published from time to
time, dealing with notable trials, recounting memorable experiences of the bench and bar, collecting the wit, eloquence, resourceful expedients, and dramatic exploits of the best known
advocates and jurists; but no one so far has written an adequate
account of the Law as it has been followed and illustrated in
the many famous forensic controversies of England and the
United States, to go no further. Such a production would afford
the most diverting and keenly fascinating set of miscellanies in
all literature, for it would blend the practice and the philosophy
of the Law, and exhibit at once the triumphs of native genius,
the trophies of intellectual training, the skill of tried and tested
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mental poise, and the highest standards of both moral and physical courage. Likewise, it would portray in the making the
tenets and tfaditions of politics and government, and present
in concrete form the movements of public opinion and the development of popular institutions. Such a work would not concern itself too much with the sensational and ppectacular features of noted criminal cases, for these relate for the most part
to the iniquities of individuals, whose infamy has indeed been
remembered for its enormity, but whose importance ceased with
the passing of the perpetrators. Rather should such a narrative contain the lineaments of those legal and judicial contests
that were "the brief and abstract chronicles of the times," mirroring in their progress and results the dominant passions and
prejudices of a critical era, exposing the wisdom or the folly of
eminent tribunals, and demonstrating how surely the law in its
evolution is but a form of social control, adapting itself to the
needs and sometimes to the weaknesses of social conditions, usually guided by- a supreme .ideal of justice' and truth, but occasionally perverted to despotic or ignoble ends. These phases
and fa7cts are not generally to be discovered in the formal records
of decided cau.ses, nor are they disclosed in the learned opinions
of distinkuished judges. They are to be found in the temper of
contemporaneous events, the prevailing trend of public sentiment, the exigencies of the crisis that provoked the controversy,
and their mingled tragedy and comedy are but the manifestations
of the fanaticism, the folly, the lofty motives or the grovelling
character of the men engaged and the measures involved. Every
legal conflict of real historical significance has had this background -of contemporaneous circumstances, and if its true but
hidden spirit is fully brought to light, it Will enliven the dead
record with vibrant interest, and breathe into its dry and tedious
formulas the flame and 'fury of antagonisms long since stilled
and almost forgotten.
The judicial annals of England are particularly rich in these,
notable historical causes, the mere recital of whose names unrolls before the memory and imagination the whole panorama
of scenes and struggles the most momentous in English political,
religious and social development for the last four hundred yearA.
In the seventeenth century the trials of Guy Fawkes and Titus
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Oates, the tragic fate of Stafford and Chales I., the arraignment
of the Seven Bishops, the career of Lord Jeffreys and his "bloody
assizes" - all of these constitute drariatic evidences of the
course of religious bigotry and intolerance, of. royal obstinacy
and arrogance, of popular credulity and fanaticism, and of the
steadily increasing power of public opinion in the shaping of Britain's policies and institutions. Coming down to a later period,
the numerous prosecutions for criminal libel in connection with
the publication of revolutionary books and pamphlets, inspired
by the recent events in America and France, furnish striking
examples of the reaction of English conservatism towards French
radicalism, and afforded splendid exhibitions of the courage and
loyalty of English lawyers in defence of liberty of thought and
freedom of speech. Such were the repeated trials of John Wilkes,
the prosecution of Jean Peltier for libelling Napoleon Bonaparte, the trial of the publisher of Thomas Paine's "Age of
Reason," the case of Rex v. Forbes et al., involving all the bitter
hatreds of Irish patriots against the Orangemen. In those
famous combats such advocates as Lord Erskine, Sir James Mackintosh, William C. Plunket, and John Henry North established
their imperishable renown as superb orators and fearless champions of equality before the law; while the modern law of libel,
with its privileges of political discussion, was formed and vindicated. And when was there ever a sadder qr. more tragic case
than that of Queen Caroline, the disowned wife 6f George IV.,
unmasking the scandals and intrigues of a corrupt prince, displaying in all its splendor the magnificent eloquence of Lord
Brougham, and invoking a political revolution by its appeal to
the sympathy of the English people? The inside story of all
of these celebrated legal conflicts, with the background of contemporaneous public sentiment, would make a volume of the
Curiosities of the Law, of transcendant interest and sound instruction.
The short chronicle of American judicial and legal transactions, by comparison with the age-long record of the English
courts, affords only a few causes of historical value, but those
which constitute examples of a similar -character are not inferior in charm and importance. Marbury v. Madison is nowadays
cited as a precedent for a fundamental principle of constitut-
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ional law, but its real origin and controlling motive underlaid the
struggle between the fast-waning Federalists and the rising
power of Jefferson's new party of Republicanism, while its background was shadowed by the malignity of personal and party
rancor. The trial of Aaron Burr for treason set the stage for
the performance of the most brilliant coterie of lawyers ever assembled in any court, and demonstrated the genius and wisdom
of the ablest jurist who ever sat upon the American bench; but
behind these open proceedings, and transcending them in actual
significance, lurked the spirit of fierce partisanship, the treachery
of influential military officials, the romance of the frontier and
the forest, the dreams of an empire yet to be born in the Southwest, and the complications of national and international politics.
The Dartmouth College Case is known to the lawyer and the
layman as authority for the inviolability of contracts, but it is
not generally known that for a long time scandal and secret imputations of corruption and cowardice against the most honored
names in American judicial annals obscured the record and in
some quarters discredited the authority of that epochal decision.
Happily, those malicious mendacities were conclusively disproved, although now and then some ignorant or jaundiced critic
9f.the Supreme Court seek9 to revive the libellous attacks that
followed close upon Webster's signal victory. Nearly everybody has heard of the Dred Scott Case, baleful precursor of the
Civil War, but very few, even among lawyers, know its true import or its actual consequences. It, too, was made the subject
of the vilest insinuations of bargain and collusion between the
illustrious Chief Justice and the President of the Urrited States,
for sectional and political ends; and the gentlest, purest, most
amiable of modern jurists went to his grave burdened and saddened by the cruel aspersions of unsdr-upulous partisans. Chief
Justice Taney was made to say, in the current slang of that bitter
era, that "the negro has no rights that the white man is bound
to respect." He said and intimated no such thing. What he
did say and what the decision announced was the law then, is
yet, and ever has been in all countries where human slavery has
existed as a legal status and a social institution. The mistake of
the Dred Scott decision was not an error of law by the court,
but a fatal assumption of jurisdiction to decide a political and
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moral problem upon a record that warranted no decision at all;
the motives of the judges who rendered it, through the mouth of
the Chief Justice, were the noblest and most patriotic, but they
sought to settle a question that was not properly before them,
and which, under the then prevalent conditions, no court should
have undertaken to dispose of. This famous case, in itself, is
one of the curiosities of American legal history.
The period following the Civil War, which was veritably the
dark age of American law and politics, if the time comes when
its amazing inconsistencies and involutions can be dispassionately considered, furnishes a tumultuous series of curiosities, in
legislation, in judicial usurpation, and in legal absurdities, the
like of which perhaps never before transpired in a country devoted to the reasonableness of the Law and the righteousness
of free government. Most of that medley of revolutionary
transactions has nowadays only an academic interest, but someday it should be examined and recorded as a lesson in the possibilities of perverted public sentiment. The greater part of the
misfeasance and malfeasance in the realms of legal and judicial
action occurred in that section of the Uhion which fell victim
to the disasters of the Lost Cause; but some of them were of universal national concern. The so-called War Amendments to the
Constitution, whatever may have been their wisdom and necessity, were proposed and adopted in direct antagonism to the
theory upon which the War had been fought and won, which
was that Sesession was an impossible achievement in "an indestructible Union of indestructible States." Yet, in order to procure the requisite number of States to ratify those Amendments,
and to so organize Congress as to enact the Reconstruction
Measures, it became necessary to treat the lately seceding States
as if they were out of the Union and not to be counted in the
enumeration of ratifying votes. If Mr. Lincoln had lived, no
such palpable contradiction and repudiation of the principle for
which he had conducted the great struggle would have been perpetrated; for, with his usual quaint mingling of wit and wisdom,
he had said: "It matters not whether the Southern States
could go out of the Union or not, they are back home now, and
we will act accordingly." But Reconstruction was forced on the
South, as the only way to avoid the manifest violation of law
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and logic involved in the adoption of the Amendments, and it
brought with it a train of devastating consequences the most deplorable a'd degrading. The attempted impeachment of President Andrew Johnson at the -inception of that troublous era was
one of the concomitant results of that policy of constitutional
innovations, and its curious features present one of the most
anomalous situations in the history of -American politics. Notwithstanding his Southern birth and environment, his antecedents, character and career, although remarkable for the forcefulness of his personality and the succes of his ambitions, were
totally at variance with Southern social traditions and distirictions. He was distrusted in thi North and despised by the old
dominant element. in the South, and so his effoft to stem the
tide of Reconstruction legislation failed of aplproval in both sections, and his offensive obstinacy -served to aggravate the -spirit
of revolutionary oppression .of the Southern -Statps that ruled
Congressional leaders at that Crisis. The true and adequate
story of that controversy ha.s-not yet been told, and its exposition
remains for the future writer of legal and political miscella-ies.
The last echoes of that memorable, but not creditable, complicqtion were heard in the Presidential cofttest before the Electoral
Commission, ten years later. Thus, first and last, the incidental
effects of Congressional Reconstruction of the South witnessed
two extraordinary judicial spectacles-the trial of a President
before the Senate sitting as a high court of impeachment, with
the Chief Justice presiding, and the decision .of a Presidential
election by a tribunal unknown and uncontemplated in any
method of procedure provided by our form of government.
It was, however, in the practical operation of the Reconstruction Measures that the most curious, not to say monstrous, legal
complications arose. At this time" it is almost impossible to
realize what that era of discord, confusion, lawlessness -and
general breaking down of civilized restraints meant in the South.
The utter demolition of the customary -safe-guards of legal security and political rights was so complete that it appears incredible in normal times, while the reign of violence, disorder, extravagance in government, corruption in politics, and despotism
in the tribunals established for justice created a condition of
desperation among the people and of reckless tyranny among
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those exercising the functions of power, that has had few parallels in history. In one Southern State four-fifths, of the Legislature were negroes- who could neither read nor write while
the Supreme Court was composed of negro judges eqtially as
illiterate and ignorant. The test oath for citizenship and suffrage, called the "Iron-clad Oath," disfranchised almost the entire intelligent white- population, by excluding from civil and
political rights all persons who had served in the Confederate
armies, or in any way aided, abetted or sympathized with the
Confederate cause. This placed all the institutions of law and
government in the hands of the small minority of whites, whose
disloyalty to the secession movement was a sure badge of their
,social inferiority and lack of identity with the great mass of the
people, and some five millions of recently emancipated slaves,
necessarily destitute of the simplest qualifications for citizenship. Ruling and directing this heterogeneous minority of
political incompetents were-the horde of "carpet-baggers"--aliens
from the-North, who swarmed into the South like a pest of locusts,. devouring the small substance of property left from the
war, misleading and inflaming the ignorant and irresponsible
negroes, domineering with insolent airs over a proud and sensitive people, whose spirit was already smarting under the defeat
of the struggle in which they had spent every energy and re-source of the land they loved and cherished. Added to these imported, leaders were a few-Southern men of ability and influence,
but whose sympathy and support were given to the Recon*struction governments, and to whom ivas applied, the sinister and
significant. name of "scalawags." For a period of approximately
five to seven years this combination of evil and degrading influences exercised absolute sway over most of the Southern
States, electing and controlling governors, legislators, judges,
peace officers, and the whole machinery of civil and political
administration. That. this is not an over-drawn picture of the
situation is demonstrable by the record of those days. It was
far worse than the era of military occupation that immediately
followed the close of the .War, and it reduced the country to
destitution and the people to despair. It was this state of affairs
that produced such organizations as the original "KuKlux Klan,"
and led to, a series of lawless outbreaks the history of 'hich
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Congressional investigating committee.
The character of legal and judicial proceedings that accompanied such a system of government may be imagined, it can
hardly be described. The desperate methods re*sorted to for
overthrowing the tyranny and debauchery of that regime were
justified by the necessities of the case, and an account of the
manner in which State after State finally resumed its institutions from this abject bondage would present many and marvellous examples of the invincible spirit of American freedom
wherever it exists. For the purpose of this article, and as a
contribution to the curiosities of the law of that exceptional period, we will mention a celebrated case that was tried before the.
Supreme Court of Texas, and which marked the liberation of
that State from "carpet-bag" rule. Two methods of "Reconstructing" the States lately in secession were tried, one by
Presidential action, upon Mr. Lincoln's theory that whether those
States had actually left the Union was immaterial, since the war
for secession had been won by the Union and the seceding States
were to all inten.ts and purposes just where they were when the
war began. It was in pursuance of that logical doctrine that
President Johnson issued his proclamation, calling-upon the
eleven States recently constituting the Southern Confederacy
to form new governments within the Union, electing their State
and local officers as aforetime, reorganizing their institutions to
conform to the new conditions which had been created by the
defeat of the secession movement, and resuming their former
status and relations as members of the United States federation.
In 1862, during the War, Congress had passed an Act under
which all persons who would take an oath to support the Constitution and laws of the United States in future might, with
certain exceptions to be determined by the President, be granted
pardon and amnesty for having participated in the "Rebellion,"
and President Johnson availed himself of the provisions of this
law to extend to the majority of the people in the recently seceding States the benefits of amnesty; thus restoring to them all
rights of citizenship. The result of this method of Reconstruction was not at all satisfactory to the radical leaders then in
control of the. government at Washington, for it enabled the
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Southern States to reorganize their loyal governments and to
resume their Federal relations, without any civil disability arising out of their participation in the War. Hence, Congress took
the matter out of the hands of the President, passed the law prescribing the "ironclad oath," disfranchising the great body of
Southerners, and then inaugurated the hateful system which
bore so heavily upon the South for the next several-years, known
as Congressional Reconstruction. Under those laws the military
commanders in the Southern States were authorized to remove
from office all. State and local officers chosen under the Presidential method, if deemed "impediments to Reconstruction," to
appoint their successors, and to order elections for new officers
and for the formation of new State constitutions, in which the
persons unable to take the test oath-who were practically the
vast majority of the electors-had no voice.
Pending the execution of the President's plan of Reconstruction above described, he appointed a provisional governor of
Texas, with plenary power and discretion to do what might seem
proper to carry that plan into effect.. Meantime, Federal troops
were kept in the State to preserve peace and order. The provisional governor appointed State officers, except the judges of
the Supreme Court, and called a constitutional convention composed of delegates to be elected by qualified voters who had
taken the amnesty oath before mentioned. That convention
met iri February, 1866, and remodelled the State Constitution
to correspond with the status produced by the late War, which
was equivalent to readopting the Constitution of 1845 under
which the State was annexed to the Union. An election for
State and local officers was held in June, 1866, and the Legislature convened in August .following. All of this transpired
peaceable and satisfactorily, and it appeared that Texas was to
resume the even tenor of her way in the restored Union of States.
But the extreme radicalism of those in power in the national
Congress repudiated these orderly proceedings, as not consonant
with their purpose and policy to "reconstruct" the South under
the control, as they expressed it, of "the friends, not the enemies,
of the Union." Under the methods of Congressional legislation
as contained in the various Reconstruction Measures, the work
the President had done in rehabilitating the State was summar-
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ily undone by the -military authorities. On July 30, 1867, the Commanding General of the military district issued an order removing
the duly elected governor of the State as "an impedimentto reconstruction," and appointed in his stead the man whom the ,had
defeated by an overwhelming popular majority the year before.
Thus what purported to be -a civil government was established
under the direct management .of 'the -military -power; being in
effect the same as a conquered province subject to a governorgeneral. The District Commander proceeded to reorganize 'the
entire - civil administration by removing -all the lately elected
officials, and appointing their -successors, including the-judiciary,
and a new constitutional convention was called to enact an organic law for the State conformable to Congressional ideals.
The "iron-clad oath" being now in full force, it was assured that
the great body of white voters would be barred from participation in the election of delegates to this convention, and -also from
voting upon the-adoption of the instrument that should be framed
and for the election of t-heofficers t6 be,chosen thereunder. The
convention met June 1, 1868, -adjourned from itime -amid .great
disorder and confusion, ;and finally dissolved 'without ;definite
adjournment, most of 'the delegates having gone home in disgust. A Constitution, Ihowever, was framed -and adopted in
November, 1869, under-the direction -ofthe military'officers conducting the -election, at 'which time also new State -and -local
officers were chosen. The new Constitution did not disfranchise as many of the white -citizens belonging-to the better class
as the extremists had desired, -and by -degrees thatclass regained
to a considerable extent 'its influence in p6litics. But -for ,the
next four years the State was Victimized, oppressed andplundered by the corrupt combination before described, until 'he -ituation became .so intolerable and 'ruinous that -intelligent .men
of substance -and 'character, without regard to party'ties, -organized to overthrow this ,despotic and degrading system. Of
course the Democratic party became ,the unit of :political -action,
and.it drew to its supportmust of the leading Republicans whose
business interests -and civilrights were imperilled'by the extravagant-and corrupt ilegislative and executive -policies, of the "Reconstruction government, 'the ,head of Which had -rendered himself
odious in the eyes of all the best men in the State. This Gover-
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nor, Edmund J. Davis, was an old Texas citizen, having been a
judge beforethe War, but during thatconflict he raised a Federal
force to invade Texas from Mexico, and his conduct since he
became chief executive had been characterized by the grossest
disregard of law and many acts of despotic and insolent oppression. His name had become a synonym for everything. despicable in the estimation of a great majority of the- respectable
white population. He took the office in January, 1870, and his
term was fixed at four years by the Constitution of 1869, or until his successor was elected and qualified. Meantime, owing to
the fast-growing opposition to his administration, and the fact
that, by operation of the amnesty which was being extended to
the voters who had been disqualified by participation in the .War
for Secession, the popular majority had gained control of affairs,
a Democratlc legislature was elected in 1872, and enacted a law
changing the method of holding elections, so that instead of the
polls being held at the county seats for four sucessive days, they
were to be open as formerly in the several voting precincts of
the counties for one day only. This change became a vital point
in the subseqent litigation, as the four days election was a Reconstruction device, the exact purpose of which is not obvious,
but the necessity for which arose from the abolition of precinct
elections and the requirement that voters must go to the county
seats to cast their ballots.
In 1873 the movement for the overthrow of the Reconstruction regime culminated in a strenuous campaign for the election
of the Demoratie candidates for State and local offices, the election was held in December of that year, and the .entire Democratic
ticket was victorious by decisive majorities all over the State.
Governor Davis had been the Republican candidate for re-election, representing the- radical elements of the Reconstruction
party. Immediately he determined to defeat the result of the
election if possible, and to hold over indefinitely, in default of
a guccessor being elected and qualified. The Supreme Court
as then constituted was composed of three judges, all of them
appointed by Governor Davis, two of whom were "carpet-baggers" who came to the.State after the.War in connection with
the military occupation, and the third belonged to the class
known as "scalawags," all of them. being political henchmen of
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the Governor's party, although they were not without ability
and judicial learing. The plan was to have this Court declare
the election held in December, 1873, null and void, because not
held in conformity with the Constitution of 1869. To raise this
issue a fictitious or feigned case was originated. The decision
of the Court is reported in Volume 39, Texas Supreme Court
Reports, page 709, under the title of Ex parte Rodriguez. A Mexican named Joseph Rodriguez was arrested at Austin upon a warrant from Houston, charged with having voted illegally at the late
election, and he applied to the Supreme Court for the writ of Habeas Corpus, to procure his discharge from custody, on the ground
that the election being illegal, null and void, he was guilty of
no offence. The ablest lawyers in the State at once enlisted on
both sides of this legal contest, and the argument before the
Court was prolonged, eloquent, and characterized by great research and ability. It was generally felt that the-Court would
respond to its political obligations, rather than to the law of the
case, but that did not deter the volunteer counsel for the State
from presenting their contentions fully and fearlessly. The
question involved arose in this manner. The election had been
conducted under the recent act of the Legislature, providing
for holding the same at the several voting precincts in each
county for one day, as had been the law prior to the Reconstruction
era. Section 6, Article III, of the Reconstruction was in these
words:
"All elections for State, district, and county officers shall be
held at the county seats of the several counties until otherwise provided by law; and the polls shall be open for four
days from 8 o'clock A. M. to 4 o'clock P. M. of each day."
It was argued in favor of the validity of the law passed by
the Legislature, and of the election held thereunder, that the
Section of the Constitution quoted clearly recognized the power
of the Legislature to change the method of holding elections
when deemed proper and necessary; that the holding of elections
for four days was rendered necessary on account *of the incoh-"
venience and impossibility of all voters in the county attending
the polls at the county seat, which they could have done under
the old system of voting at their respective precinct polls; and
that this necessity having been removed by the restoration of
precinct voting, the constitutional provision for four days vot-
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ing was no longer necessary or applicable, and should be considered as having been superseded by the legislative act. On
the other hand, it was contended by counsel for the relator that
the two portions of Section 6, Article III, of the Constitution,
separated by the semi-colon, entirely independent of each other,
and that a change by the legislature from county seat voting
to precinct voting did not and could affect the latter portion of
the Section, referring to the holding of elections for four days.
The case aroused public interest to a fever heat, the lawyers engaged in the argument indulged in bitter political animosities
and personal reflections, the. Court was manifestly uneasy and
nervous, but it did its duty to the Governor who made it, rather
than to reason and logic, and held that the election was null and
void. In a very elaborate opinion, with a disquisition on grammar, punctuation, and syntax, the learned judges decided that
the whole issue was disposed of by the Semi-Colon, which completely separated the places of voting from the time for voting, thus
establishing two independent purposes of the Section involved,
and that, therefore, the Legislature could not change the length
of time the polls should be open, although it might change the
places where the polls should be located. The indignation with
which this decision was greeted by the public was instantaneous
and fierce, and it.was not short-lived. The judges were at once
called the "semi-colon judges," the Court itself was. named the
"Semi-colon Court," and from that day forward no Texas lawyer ever cited any decision of the Court that rendered the judgment in the Rodriguez case, while by common consent of bench
and bar the several volumes of the Supreme Court Reports containing decisions by the judges who delivered the opinion in that
controversy have been excluded from consideration in the courts
of the State. Many of those decisions are of great weight and
wisdom, for the "semi-colon judges" were capable men in their
profession, but so intense and inveterate was the public hostility
excited by their action, and so firmly fixed was the general conviction that the decision was controlled by party bias and political servility, that they and all their works have been consigned
to obloquy in Texas, ever since they made a quibble of punctuation of greater moment than a sane rule of constitutional interpretation. When the "semi-colon decision" was announced it
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met with universal derision and contempt, the newly elected
officers at once prepared to take possession of the positions to
which they had been chosen by the people, volunteer troops
from all parts of the State gathered at the capital to .support the
movement, old soldiers and officers who but a few years before
had followed the banners of te Confederacy assumed once more
their warlike functions, and the new Governor and his associates
in the administration occupied the state-house, ready to use
force if necessary. Governor Davis appealed to President Grant
for Federal troops to protect his claim to continue in office, but
upon the opinion of the Attorney-General the President refused
this request, and in a few days Reconstruction rule had come to
an end, to be recalled only as a bitter and evil memory of the past.
This Texas case is thus mentioned at length, not only as
one of the curious and dramatic incidents in the annals of that
abnormal period of American institutions, but because, properly
understood, it furnishes some valuable and suggestive lessons in
the history of law and government in the United States. It
illustrates the fundamental love of freedom, justice, equality, and
orderly procedure among Americans everywhere in the Republic.
What happened in Texas then could and would have happened
in any other American state under like circumstances. It did
happen in similar conditions, with more or less variation, in
other Southern States during the Reconstruction era, until finally the North came to realize that what the South asked for and
was prepared to obtain at any cost, was the same thing that Otis
and Adams in Massachusetts, and Henry and Jefferson in Virginia, had demanded and fought for at the threshold of the Nation's independence-the enforcement of the doctrine that all
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and that rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.
Long ago the Supreme Court of the United States declared that
the true spirit and genius of the American conception of political institutions is not to be found in the formal and necessarily
narrow provisions of the Constitution, but in the wide and wise
and universal principles of freedom and righteousness set forth
in the Decralation of Independence. That this is an irrate and
instinctive trait of the American ideal of government, has been
demonstrated often and emphatically in the judicial and legisla-
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tive annals of the Uiion. The Dred Scott decision was a correct
exposition of primary principles of the law of property rights,
bui its tenor and purpose were so misrepresented and perverted
by public opinion, misled by partisan criticism, that the Court
that rendered it was scandalized and discredited, and to this day
rto lawyer likes to cite the case as an authority, Like the Rodgriguez case, just discussed, it demonstrated that the judgment
of the courts, the acts of officials, the transactions of government,
must ultimately come to the bar of popular approval or condemnation, and be tried by the fundamental test of the original truths
and doctrines upon which all free institutions are to be judged
in a republic. The same thing has been proved many times and
in many places, both in this country and in England, since the
same underlying political principles belong to both nations. If
the "Curiosities of the Law" is ever adequately and sympathetically written, its most valuable topic will be to illustrate this fact
bytthe historical cases in which it has been exhibited.

